conducted ultra vires are likewise attributable to the State in question.48 This applies a maiore ad minus when only parts of an operation are ultra vires. Generally, the mere (remote) use of cyber infrastructure located in the territory of a State (forum State) by another State (acting State) for the implementation of malicious cyber operations by the latter does not lead to an attribution of the acting State’s conduct to the forum State. However, the forum State may under certain circumstances incur responsibility on separate grounds, for example if its conduct with regard to another State’s use of its cyber infrastructure for malicious purposes qualifies as aid or assistance.49 This inter alia applies if the forum State actively and knowingly provides the acting State with access to its cyber infrastructure and thereby facilitates malicious cyber operations by the other State.50 Moreover, cyber operations conducted by non-State actors which act on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, a State are attributable to that State.51 The same principles apply as in the physical world: if a State recurs to private actors in order to commit an unlawful deed, the actions by the private actor will regularly be attributable to the State. States should recognize that they are accountable for the actions of proxies acting under their control.52 The State must have control over a specific cyber operation or set of cyber operations conducted by the non-State actor. While a sufficient degree or intensity of such control is necessary, the State is not required to have detailed insight into or influence over all particulars, especially those of a technical nature, of the cyber operation. A comprehensive assessment of the circumstances of the individual case will be necessary to establish an attributive link.53 Beyond the mentioned situations of attribution and aid and assistance, a State may also become liable under international law in connection with another State’s or a non-State actor’s actions if the first State fails to abide by its obligations stemming from the ‘due diligence’ principle.54 The application of the international rules on State responsibility and hence the act of formally attributing a malicious cyber operation to a State under international law is first and foremost a national prerogative; however, international cooperation and exchange of information with partners in this regard can be of vital importance. In practice, establishing the facts upon which a decision on attribution may be based is of specific concern in the context of cyber operations since the author of a malicious cyber operation may be more difficult to trace than that of a kinetic operation. At the same time, a sufficient level of confidence for an attribution of wrongful acts needs to be reached. Gathering relevant 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 7; Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rules 15, commentary, paras. 6, 12. Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 16; Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 18 (a). Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 16, commentary, para. 1; Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 18, commentary, para. 3. Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 8; Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), rule 17 (a). Cf. UN Group of Governmental Experts, reports of 2013 and 2015 (note 1), paras. 23 and 28 (e) respectively. Cf. Draft Articles on State Responsibility (note 46), art. 8, commentary, paras. 5 in fine, 7. See also above, II.a). 11

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