information about the incident or campaign in question has a technical dimension and may
involve processes of data forensics, open sources research, human intelligence and reliance
upon other sources – including, where applicable, information and assessments by
independent and credible non-state actors. Generating the necessary contextual knowledge,
assessing a suspected actor’s motivation for conducting malicious cyber operations and
weighing the plausibility of alternative explanations regarding the authorship of a certain
malicious cyber act will likewise be part of the process. All relevant information should be
considered.55
Germany agrees that there is no general obligation under international law as it currently
stands to publicize a decision on attribution and to provide or to submit for public scrutiny
detailed evidence on which an attribution is based. This generally applies also if response
measures are taken.56 Any such publication in a particular case is generally based on political
considerations and does not create legal obligations for the State under international law.
Also, it is within the political discretion of a State to decide on the timing of a public act of
attribution. Nevertheless, Germany supports the UN Group of Governmental Experts’
position in its 2015 report that accusations of cyber-related misconduct against a State
should be substantiated.57 States should provide information and reasoning and – if
circumstances permit – attempt to communicate and cooperate with the State in question to
clarify the allegations raised. This may bolster the transparency, legitimacy and general
acceptance of decisions on attribution and any response measures taken.58
Attribution in the context of State responsibility must be distinguished from politically
assigning responsibility for an incident to States or non-State actors: Generally, such
statements are made at the discretion of each State and constitute a manifestation of State
sovereignty. Acts of politically assigning responsibility may occur in cooperation with
partners. As regards attribution in the legal sense, findings of national law-based (court)
proceedings involving acts of attribution, for example in the context of criminal liability of
certain office holders or non-State actors, may serve as indicators in the process of
establishing State responsibility. However, it should be borne in mind that the criteria of
attribution under international law do not necessarily correspond to those under domestic
law and that additional or specific criteria are generally relevant when establishing State
responsibility for individually attributed conduct. Moreover, the adoption of targeted
restrictive measures against natural or legal persons, entities or bodies under the EU Cyber
Sanctions Regime59 does not as such imply the attribution of conduct to a State by Germany
in a legal sense.60
55
56
57
58
59
Cf. also the voluntary, non-binding recommendation made by the UN Group of Governmental Experts, report of
2015 (note 1), para. 13 (b).
On these points, see Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), chapter 4, section 1, para. 13.
UN Group of Governmental Experts, report of 2015 (note 1), para. 28 (f).
Cf. also Tallinn Manual 2.0 (note 4), chapter 4, section 1, para. 13, citing the UN Group of Governmental Experts,
report of 2015 (note 1).
Council Regulation (EU) 2019/796 of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks
threatening the Union or its Member States, OJ L 129I, 17 May 2019, p. 1–12; Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/797
of 17 May 2019 concerning restrictive measures against cyber-attacks threatening the Union or its Member States,
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