Annexes
a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.
an international obligation, and that
violation is attributable to the state, that
state will be responsible for the violation.
The IHL principle of military necessity
states that a combatant is justified in
using those measures, not forbidden by
international law, which are indispensable
for securing complete submission of
an enemy at the soonest moment.
The principle cannot be used to justify
actions prohibited by law, as the means
to achieve victory are not unlimited.
The customary international law on state
responsibility, much of which is reflected
in the International Law Commission’s
Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, apply to
state behaviour in cyberspace.
The IHL principle of distinction seeks
to ensure that only legitimate military
objects are attacked. Distinction has
two components. The first, relating
to personnel, seeks to maintain the
distinction between combatants and
non-combatants or military and civilian
personnel. The second component
distinguishes between legitimate military
targets and civilian objects.
All Australian military capabilities are
employed in line with approved targeting
procedures. Cyber operations are no
different. Australian targeting procedures
comply with the requirements of IHL
and trained legal officers provide
decision-makers with advice to ensure
that Australia satisfies its obligations
under international law and its domestic
legal requirements.
For example, Australia considers that,
if a cyber operation rises to the same
threshold as that of a kinetic ‘attack
under IHL’, the rules governing such
attacks during armed conflict will apply
to those kinds of cyber operations.
3. For cyber activities taking place
outside of armed conflict, general
principles of international law, including
the law on state responsibility, apply.
It is a longstanding rule of international
law that, if a state acts in violation of
To the extent that a state enjoys the
right to exercise sovereignty over
objects and activities within its territory,
it necessarily shoulders corresponding
responsibilities to ensure those objects
and activities are not used to harm other
states. In this context, we note it may not
be reasonable to expect (or even possible
for) a state to prevent all malicious use
of ICT infrastructure located within its
territory. However, in Australia’s view,
if a state is aware of an internationally
wrongful act originating from or routed
through its territory, and it has the ability
to put an end to the harmful activity, that
state should take reasonable steps to do
so consistent with international law.
If a state is a victim of malicious cyber
activity which is attributable to a
perpetrator state, the victim state
may be able to take countermeasures
against the perpetrator state, under
certain circumstances. However,
countermeasures that amount to a
use of force are not permissible. Any
use of countermeasures involving
cyberspace must be proportionate.
It is acknowledged that this raises
challenges in identifying and assessing
direct and indirect effects of malicious
cyber activity, in order to gauge a
proportionate response. The purpose
of countermeasures is to compel the
other party to desist in the ongoing
unlawful conduct.
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