connect to open wireless networks that they have previously connected to. To ensure that a
wireless network provided for public access cannot be used as a launching platform for attacks
against an agency’s system it must be segregated from all other systems. Security architectures
incorporating segmented networks, DMZ’s and other segregation mechanisms are useful in this
regard. Wireless access points that have been certified in a Wi‐Fi Alliance certification program
provide an agency with assurance that they conform to wireless standards. Deploying wireless
access points that are guaranteed to be interoperable with other wireless access points on a
wireless network will limit incompatibility of wireless equipment and incorrect implementation of
wireless devices by vendors.
A number of Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) methods, supported by the Wi‐Fi Protected
Access 2 (WPA2) protocol, are available.Ultimately, an agency’s choice in authentication method
will often be based on the size of their wireless deployment, their security requirements and any
existing authentication infrastructure. If an agency is primarily motivated by security they can
implement either PEAP‐EAP‐TLS or EAP‐TLS. If they are primarily motivated by flexibility and legacy
support they can implement EAP‐TTLS. If they are primarily motivated by simplicity they can
implement PEAP with EAP‐MSCHAPv2.
To reduce the likelihood of a stolen smart card from being used to gain unauthorized access to a
wireless network, two‐factor authentication can be implemented through the use of Personal
Identification Numbers (PINs) on smart cards. This is essential when a smart card grants a user any
form of administrative access on a wireless network or attached network resource.
A security risk exists with EAP‐TTLS and PEAP when a commercial certificate authority’s certificates
are automatically trusted by devices using vendor trusted certificate stores. This trust can be
exploited by obtaining certificates from a commercial certificate authority under false pretenses, as
devices can be tricked into trusting their signed certificate.
When 802.1X authentication is used, a shared secret key known as the Pairwise Master Key (PMK) is
generated. Upon successful authentication of a device, the PMK can be cached to assist with fast
roaming between wireless access points. When a device roams away from a wireless access point
that it has authenticated to, it will not need to perform a full re‐authentication should it roam back
while the cached PMK remains valid. To further assist with roaming, wireless access points can be
configured to pre‐authenticate a device to other neighboring wireless access points that the device
might roam to. Although requiring full authentication for a device each time it roams between
wireless access points is ideal, agencies can chose to use PMK caching and pre‐authentication if
they have a business requirement for fast roaming. If PMK caching is used, the PMK caching period
should not be set to greater than 1440 minutes (24 hours).
103
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