4
For Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, Russia has
had to pay a high price not only because Ukraine itself
strongly resists Russia’s aggression but also because
the international community is imposing strong
coordinated sanctions against Russia and continues to
support Ukraine. In addition, European countries stand
more united against Russian threats, and the European
security environment is at a major turning point in the
wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Clearly,
the aggression by Russia, which has seen NATO’s
8
See
Chapter
2
Chapter 3, Section 5-3-1 (Nuclear Forces)
Chapter 3, Section 5-4 (Russian Forces in Japan’s Northern
Territories)
The Impact of the Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine on International Affairs and Various Countries’ Responses to It
1 General Situation
7
Russia has put importance on the role of military
power and has sought to secure its powerful voice in
the international community against the backdrop of the
military power, but huge losses through its aggression
against Ukraine will likely bring a decline of its power
in medium- to long-term as well as changes of the
military balances in surrounding areas.8 In particular,
Russia may not only further seek to maintain and secure
its influence on regions comprising the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), such as Belarus
and Kazakhstan, but also further deepen its relations
with China, which is considered to have something in
common in terms of security, including countering the
United States. In addition, Russia may further increase
its emphasis on nuclear forces as a deterrent power
until it recovers from the damage of its conventional
forces from its invasion of Ukraine. If this happens, in
the area surrounding Japan, the Russian military may
further increase its activities around the Sea of Okhotsk,
near the Northern Territories of Japan and the Chishima
Islands, where its strategic nuclear-powered submarines
constituting an important part of Russia’s strategic
nuclear capability are operating.
Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine
that the AFRF suffered huge losses7 because they did
not concentrate ground troops on particular fronts
and conducted piecemeal deployments to multiple
fronts, which caused some to question the Russian
military’s operational capability in a large-scale war. In
addition, it is considered that Russian cyber attacks and
electronic warfare have not been as effective as initially
expected. It is also conceivable that the so-called
hybrid warfare instruments, such as false flag campaign
and disinformation, focused on making it difficult to
identify true actors, justifying their actions, and sending
out disturbing information, have not worked well not
only because the nature of these instruments is not
consistent with a full-scale invasion using large-scale
forces which cannot hide true actors, but also because
Russia’s intentions were made public widely through
active intelligence disclosures by the United States
and the United Kingdom. On the other hand, Ukraine
is acquiring huge external assistance from not only
state governments but also private entities through its
proactive information dissemination by key government
leaders including Mr. Fedorov, Vice Prime Minister.
The Ukrainian government also got ahead of Russia in
fields such as intelligence, media, and cyberspace by
recruiting volunteers to organize an “IT Army” whose
main duty is to conduct cyber attacks against Russia.
eastward expansion as a threat to itself, catalyzed
European countries to shift their security policies
in this manner. Therefore, it is doubtful to say that
Russia’s strategic objective of ensuring its own security
through maintaining its “sphere of influence” has been
achieved by the aggression. In this regard, based on
the recognition that the security of Europe and that
of the Indo-Pacific region including Eastern Asia are
indivisible, Japan needs to pay attention to the future
developments of the situation in Europe, including
its strategic effects. This is because Japan is a close
ally of the United States, a NATO member state, and
For Russian military losses, Russia suffered 23,500 deaths according to an announcement by Ukraine’s General Staff Office on May 1, 2022. On the other hand, the Russian Ministry of Defense
announced 1,351 had been killed and 3,825 left wounded on March 25 of the same year. For casualties on the Ukrainian side, President Zelenskyy said on April 16 of the same year that 2,500
to 3,000 were killed in combat and approximately 10,000 were left wounded.
On April 25, 2022, US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that Russia had failed to achieve its principal aim to totally subjugate Ukraine and that the Russia had already lost a lot of military
capability. In addition, on May 2 of the same year, the UK Ministry of Defence announced its analyses, saying that although Russia had deployed forces equivalent to approximately 65% of all its
entire ground combat strength at the initial phase of the aggression against Ukraine, more than quarter of these units might be rendered combat ineffective. Furthermore, UK Ministry of Defence
indicated that some of Russia’s most elite units, including airborne forces had suffered the highest levels of attrition and it would probably take years for Russia to rebuild these forces.
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
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