Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan Fig. I-3-4-3 Range of North Korea’s Ballistic Missiles New York Taepodong-2 variant ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” (Range: more than 10,000km*) *Depends on weight of the warhead, etc. Washington D. C. 10,000km Chicago London Paris San Francisco Los Angeles 5,500km Moscow Anchorage 5,000km 4,000km Hawaii 1,500km New Delhi ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” (Range: more than 5,500km) 1,300km Beijing 1,000km Pyongyang Tokyo Okinawa Guam IRBM-class “Hwasong-12” (Range: approx. 5,000km) Chapter 3 Musudan (Range: approx. 2,500 to 4,000km) Nodong (Range: approx. 1,300km/1,500km) Defense Policies of Countries Scud-ER (Range: approx. 1,000km) Jakarta Canberra Note 1: The figure above shows a rough image of the distance each missile can reach from Pyongyang for the sake of convenience. Note 2: Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. Note 3: The firing range for ICBM-class ballistic missile “Hwasong-17” can reach 15,000 km or more, depending on the warhead’s weight etc. When hypothetically calculating a distance of 15,000 km from Pyongyang, the trajectory can include the whole African continent and part of the South American continent. reached through North Korea’s previous six nuclear tests, it is assessed that North Korea has already miniaturized nuclear weapons to fit ballistic missile warheads.12 There have also been reports that North Korea possesses 40 to 50 nuclear warheads.13 Furthermore, the yield of the sixth nuclear weapons test in 2017 was estimated to be the largest ever, with a maximum yield of approximately 160 kt. Given the size of the estimated yield, the possibility cannot be discounted that the test was of a hydrogen bomb.14 In addition, it has been suggested that North Korea has been working on restoring its northern nuclear test site since March 2022, which it publicly announced it had blown up in 2018. In any case, North Korea’s nuclear weapons development, considered in conjunction with North Korean efforts to enhance ballistic missile capabilities, including extending 12 13 14 15 83 the range of ballistic missiles that are the delivery vehicles of WMDs, poses grave and imminent threats to Japan’s security, and significantly undermines peace and security of the region and international community. These trends have been growing in recent years, and it can never be accepted. b. Background of the Nuclear Program North Korea’s ultimate goal is allegedly the maintenance of the existing regime.15 Taking into account aspects such as claims by North Korea that nuclear weapons would never be traded away at negotiations, as well as the significant qualitative disparity in conventional forces vis-à-vis the United States and the ROK, it is believed that North Korea is promoting nuclear development with the recognition that it needs its own nuclear deterrence to maintain its regime against the threat from the United States, which includes nuclear weapons. Over ten years have already passed since North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in October 2006. Furthermore, North Korea has conducted six nuclear tests to date. This timetable for technology development and the number of tests are reaching levels that are by no means inadequate, even when compared to the processes of developing technologies to miniaturize and lighten nuclear weapons in the United States, former Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China. The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK assesses that “North Korea’s ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons seems to have reached a considerable level.” According to SIPRI Yearbook 2021. The 2020 Defense White Paper of the ROK noted that the explosive yield of the sixth nuclear test was approximately 50 kt, significantly larger than the yield of the past tests and that this was assessed to be a hydrogen bomb test. North Korea also insisted that its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January 2016, was a hydrogen bomb test. However, given that the yield of that test is estimated at 6 to 7 kts, it is difficult to conceive that this was a hydrogen bomb test as generally defined. According to “Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea” by the U.S. DoD (February 2016), and others. DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022

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