Korean Peninsula Section 4 Fig. I-3-4-6 Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea Main content Items Sanction content Related resolution Crude oil Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons No. 2397 (December 2017) Petroleum refined products Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels No. 2397 (December 2017) Coal Total ban on imports from North Korea No. 2371 (August 2017) Ship offloading (ship-to-ship transfer) Banned No. 2375 (September 2017) Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea Resolution Catalyst event 2006.7.16 Date No. 1695 Seven ballistic missiles launches (2006/7/5) Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans Main content 2006.10.15 No. 1718 First nuclear test (2006/10/9) Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and large weapons 2009.6.13 No. 1874 Taepodong-2 launch (2009/4/5), second nuclear test (2009/5/25) Adoption of financial regulations 2013.1.23 No. 2087 Taepodong-2 launch (2012/12/12) Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions Chapter 3 No. 2094 Third nuclear test (2013/2/12) 2016.3.3 No. 2270 Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong-2 launch (2016/2/7) Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North Korea (excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea’s nuclear and missile plans) 2016.11.30 No. 2321 Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9) Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports by North Korea (roughly $400 million/7.5 million tons a year) 2017.6.3 No. 2356 Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9 Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions 2017.8.6 No. 2371 ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” launch (2017/7/4 Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of an upper and 7/28) limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the first time 2017.9.12 No. 2375 Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3) Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the import ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers 2017.12.23 No. 2397 ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” launch (2017/11/29) Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/ imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea Defense Policies of Countries 2013.3.8 Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods on ships suspected of transporting banned goods within one’s own territorial waters * Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea. several times mainly by ship-to-ship transfers, although at a much lower degree as compared to previous years. See Fig. I-3-4-6 (Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea) 5 Relations with States and Regions (1) Relations with the United States In June 2018 at the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit meeting, President Kim made clear his intention to work towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the second U.S.-North Korea summit meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement being reached between the two parties. Subsequently, Chairman Kim indicated the stance that there would never be denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula until the United States rolled back its hostile policy towards North Korea and that North Korea would maintain its nuclear deterrence against the United States’ nuclear threat. In January 2021, he referred to the United States as the “principal enemy” while noting that the key to establishing a new U.S.-North Korea relationship would be the withdrawal of the hostile policy by the United States. The Biden administration of the United States, which was inaugurated that same month, in April of the same year, announced that it had completed a review of its policy towards North Korea and that it would explore diplomacy with North Korea under a “calibrated, practical approach” with the continued goal of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” In response to these developments, in June of the same year, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea should “be prepared for both dialogue and confrontation” and needed “especially to get fully prepared for confrontation” DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 96

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