Korean Peninsula Section 4
Fig. I-3-4-6
Sanctions based on UN Security Council Resolutions against North Korea
Main content
Items
Sanction content
Related resolution
Crude oil
Restriction of annual supply to 4 million barrels or 525,000 tons
No. 2397
(December 2017)
Petroleum refined products
Restriction of annual supply to 500,000 barrels
No. 2397
(December 2017)
Coal
Total ban on imports from North Korea
No. 2371
(August 2017)
Ship offloading (ship-to-ship transfer)
Banned
No. 2375
(September 2017)
Summary of recent UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions against North Korea
Resolution
Catalyst event
2006.7.16
Date
No. 1695
Seven ballistic missiles launches (2006/7/5)
Request transfer prohibition on related goods and funds for nuclear and missile plans
Main content
2006.10.15
No. 1718
First nuclear test (2006/10/9)
Prohibition on export and import of weapons of mass destruction related goods and large
weapons
2009.6.13
No. 1874
Taepodong-2 launch (2009/4/5), second
nuclear test (2009/5/25)
Adoption of financial regulations
2013.1.23
No. 2087
Taepodong-2 launch (2012/12/12)
Addition of six organizations and four individuals to sanctions
Chapter
3
No. 2094
Third nuclear test (2013/2/12)
2016.3.3
No. 2270
Fourth nuclear test (2016/1/6), Taepodong-2
launch (2016/2/7)
Ban on air fuel exports and supply and ban on coal and iron ore exports by North Korea
(excluding those for personal livelihood or unrelated to North Korea’s nuclear and missile plans)
2016.11.30
No. 2321
Fifth nuclear test (2016/9/9)
Establishment of an upper limit on coal exports by North Korea (roughly $400 million/7.5 million
tons a year)
2017.6.3
No. 2356
Ballistic missile launches since 2016/9/9
Addition of four organizations and 14 individuals to sanctions
2017.8.6
No. 2371
ICBM-class “Hwasong-14” launch (2017/7/4 Total ban on coal imports, total ban on iron and iron ore imports, and establishment of an upper
and 7/28)
limit on the total number of work permits for North Korean workers for the first time
2017.9.12
No. 2375
Sixth nuclear test (2017/9/3)
Addition of oil to supply restrictions for the first time, addition of textile products to the import
ban, and ban on work permits for overseas workers
2017.12.23
No. 2397
ICBM-class “Hwasong-15” launch
(2017/11/29)
Further supply restrictions in the oil area, expansion of the scope of bans on trade (exports/
imports) with North Korea bans, and return of North Korean workers to North Korea
Defense Policies of Countries
2013.3.8
Tougher financial regulations and obligation to conduct inspections of goods on ships suspected
of transporting banned goods within one’s own territorial waters
* Quotation marks indicate the names used by North Korea.
several times mainly by ship-to-ship transfers, although at
a much lower degree as compared to previous years.
See
Fig. I-3-4-6 (Sanctions based on UN Security Council
Resolutions against North Korea)
5 Relations with States and Regions
(1) Relations with the United States
In June 2018 at the first-ever U.S.-North Korea summit
meeting, President Kim made clear his intention to work
towards the complete denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. However, the second U.S.-North Korea summit
meeting in February 2019 ended without any agreement
being reached between the two parties.
Subsequently, Chairman Kim indicated the stance that
there would never be denuclearization on the Korean
Peninsula until the United States rolled back its hostile
policy towards North Korea and that North Korea would
maintain its nuclear deterrence against the United States’
nuclear threat. In January 2021, he referred to the United
States as the “principal enemy” while noting that the key to
establishing a new U.S.-North Korea relationship would be
the withdrawal of the hostile policy by the United States.
The Biden administration of the United States, which
was inaugurated that same month, in April of the same
year, announced that it had completed a review of its policy
towards North Korea and that it would explore diplomacy
with North Korea under a “calibrated, practical approach”
with the continued goal of “complete denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula.”
In response to these developments, in June of the same
year, Chairman Kim stated that North Korea should “be
prepared for both dialogue and confrontation” and needed
“especially to get fully prepared for confrontation”
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