Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
with regard to its policy towards the United States. In
September of the same year, he stated that there had been
no change in “U.S. military threats and hostile policy” and
that the United States’ claims of “diplomatic engagement”
and “dialogue without preconditions” were “a petty trick
for hiding its hostile acts.” In October of the same year,
Chairman Kim stated that there was not any reason to
believe that the United States was not hostile, but also that
“our arch-enemy is the war itself” and not a specific nation
or power such as the United States.
Furthermore, in January 2022, Chairman Kim ordered
North Korean officials to “promptly examine the issue of
restarting all temporarily suspended activities” based on
the assessment that the “hostile policy and military threat
by the U.S. have reached a danger line that cannot be
overlooked anymore” given that the U.S. has repeatedly
conducted joint military exercises since the U.S.-North
Korea summit meeting. North Korea has actually been
launching ICBM-class ballistic missiles since February
2022, and following the launch on March 24 of the same
year, stated that it would thoroughly prepare for a longterm confrontation with the U.S. In this way, North Korea
has acted in contradiction to its decision to discontinue
“inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire” it itself
announced in April 2018, and attention will be paid to
future developments, including the possibility of further
escalations of unilateral provocations.
Chapter
3
Defense Policies of Countries
(2) Relations with the ROK
In 2018, substantial progress was realized in inter-Korean
relations. The three inter-Korean summit meetings led to
an agreement on the “Panmunjom Declaration,” which
confirmed, among other matters, that the two parties
agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each
other in every domain, and confirmed the common goal
of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The summit
meetings also led to an agreement on the “Pyongyang Joint
Declaration of September 2018,” which referred to the
ending of military hostilities, and the “Agreement on the
Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in
the Military Domain,” which prescribed concrete measures
to ease inter-Korean military tensions.
However, 2019 saw no major advances in inter-Korean
dialogue and cooperation programs, while in 2020 there
was a temporary increase in tension seen in the interKorean relationship. Since June of the same year, North
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According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA)
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
Korea has reacted to the distribution of flyers criticizing
Chairman Kim by a North Korean defectors group. North
Korea has also shown moves such as the explosion of
the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong, and its
announcement that it was considering (and later suspended)
a military action plan that included the strengthening of
military posture along the DMZ.
On the other hand, North Korea appears to be taking a
carrot and stick approach to the ROK. In January 2021, at
the 8th Congress of the KWP, Chairman Kim mentioned
that depending on the attitude of the ROK, inter-Korean
relations could return to a new starting point of peace
and prosperity. In July of the same year, inter-Korean
communication lines, which had been cut off for more than
a year, were restored (they were later cut off in August of
the same year, but then restored again in October of the
same year). In addition, in September of the same year, in
response to the “end-of-war declaration” proposed by then
ROK President Moon Jae-in at the UN General Assembly
that month, Chairman Kim first stated that the ROK should
withdraw its “partial view, unfair and double-dealing
attitude and hostile viewpoint and policies” towards North
Korea, while expressing his belief that the future of interKorean relations depends on the attitude of the ROK side.
Furthermore, in October of the same year, he stated that
tensions on the Korean Peninsula would not arise if the
ROK did not meddle, and that defense forces were not
being strengthened with the ROK as the target, noting that
their history of “ having recourse to arms against the fellow
countrymen” must not be repeated.
Movements in the future of inter-Korean relations,
including the policy toward North Korea of the Yoon Sukyeol administration, inaugurated in May 2022, and North
Korea’s reaction, will be closely watched.
(3) Relations with Other States
(i) Relations with China
China is a vital political and economic partner for North
Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea.
The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation
and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is
still in force. In addition, China is currently North Korea’s
biggest trade partner. In 2020, trade volume between China
and North Korea was very large, accounting for over 90%
of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between
North Korea and the ROK),31 suggesting North Korea’s
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