Part I Security Environment Surrounding Japan with regard to its policy towards the United States. In September of the same year, he stated that there had been no change in “U.S. military threats and hostile policy” and that the United States’ claims of “diplomatic engagement” and “dialogue without preconditions” were “a petty trick for hiding its hostile acts.” In October of the same year, Chairman Kim stated that there was not any reason to believe that the United States was not hostile, but also that “our arch-enemy is the war itself” and not a specific nation or power such as the United States. Furthermore, in January 2022, Chairman Kim ordered North Korean officials to “promptly examine the issue of restarting all temporarily suspended activities” based on the assessment that the “hostile policy and military threat by the U.S. have reached a danger line that cannot be overlooked anymore” given that the U.S. has repeatedly conducted joint military exercises since the U.S.-North Korea summit meeting. North Korea has actually been launching ICBM-class ballistic missiles since February 2022, and following the launch on March 24 of the same year, stated that it would thoroughly prepare for a longterm confrontation with the U.S. In this way, North Korea has acted in contradiction to its decision to discontinue “inter-continental ballistic rocket test-fire” it itself announced in April 2018, and attention will be paid to future developments, including the possibility of further escalations of unilateral provocations. Chapter 3 Defense Policies of Countries (2) Relations with the ROK In 2018, substantial progress was realized in inter-Korean relations. The three inter-Korean summit meetings led to an agreement on the “Panmunjom Declaration,” which confirmed, among other matters, that the two parties agreed to completely cease all hostile acts against each other in every domain, and confirmed the common goal of realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The summit meetings also led to an agreement on the “Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018,” which referred to the ending of military hostilities, and the “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” which prescribed concrete measures to ease inter-Korean military tensions. However, 2019 saw no major advances in inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation programs, while in 2020 there was a temporary increase in tension seen in the interKorean relationship. Since June of the same year, North 31 97 According to an announcement by the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022 Korea has reacted to the distribution of flyers criticizing Chairman Kim by a North Korean defectors group. North Korea has also shown moves such as the explosion of the Inter-Korean Joint Liaison Office in Kaesong, and its announcement that it was considering (and later suspended) a military action plan that included the strengthening of military posture along the DMZ. On the other hand, North Korea appears to be taking a carrot and stick approach to the ROK. In January 2021, at the 8th Congress of the KWP, Chairman Kim mentioned that depending on the attitude of the ROK, inter-Korean relations could return to a new starting point of peace and prosperity. In July of the same year, inter-Korean communication lines, which had been cut off for more than a year, were restored (they were later cut off in August of the same year, but then restored again in October of the same year). In addition, in September of the same year, in response to the “end-of-war declaration” proposed by then ROK President Moon Jae-in at the UN General Assembly that month, Chairman Kim first stated that the ROK should withdraw its “partial view, unfair and double-dealing attitude and hostile viewpoint and policies” towards North Korea, while expressing his belief that the future of interKorean relations depends on the attitude of the ROK side. Furthermore, in October of the same year, he stated that tensions on the Korean Peninsula would not arise if the ROK did not meddle, and that defense forces were not being strengthened with the ROK as the target, noting that their history of “ having recourse to arms against the fellow countrymen” must not be repeated. Movements in the future of inter-Korean relations, including the policy toward North Korea of the Yoon Sukyeol administration, inaugurated in May 2022, and North Korea’s reaction, will be closely watched. (3) Relations with Other States (i) Relations with China China is a vital political and economic partner for North Korea and maintains a degree of influence on North Korea. The China-North Korea Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, which was concluded in 1961, is still in force. In addition, China is currently North Korea’s biggest trade partner. In 2020, trade volume between China and North Korea was very large, accounting for over 90% of North Korea’s total trade (excluding trade between North Korea and the ROK),31 suggesting North Korea’s

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