Part I
Security Environment Surrounding Japan
“historic rights” as the basis of the “nine-dash line”
claimed by China, and determined the illegality of
China’s activities such as land reclamation. However,
China has clearly stated its intention not to comply
with the award and has continued the militarization of
the features by developing military facilities such as
batteries and various infrastructures that can be used for
military purposes, such as runways, harbors, hangars and
radar facilities, and by deploying military aircraft and
conducting air trainings such as taking off and landing.
These activities may result in a significant improvement
of Chinese operational conducting capability within the
South China Sea. It has been pointed out that if China
were to consider bastion operations (fortification) to
enhance the survivability of new type of long-range
SLBMs capable of targeting the U.S. mainland, the
South China Sea would be the suitable choice.2
Moreover, in July and August 2016 after the
arbitration award between the Philippines and China
was rendered, an H-6K bomber of the PLA Air Force
(PLAAF) conducted combat air patrols in the airspace
around Scarborough Shoal, with China’s Ministry of
National Defense announcing that it would conduct
these patrols regularly from now on. Furthermore, it is
to be believed that China conducted military exercises
and launch experiments for ballistic missiles. These
show the PLA has been intensifying its operations in the
South China Sea.
In a dangerous act that could cause unintended
consequences, PLA Navy and other ships approached
and obstructed a U.S. Navy ship sailing in the South
China Sea in September 2018.
Furthermore, China is using methods other than its
military. For example, in some cases the China Coast
Guard patrol vessels obstructed foreign fisher boats
approaching the features by firing warning shots or
water cannons at them, and it is pointed out that maritime
militia is active.3 Furthermore, China unilaterally
announced the establishment of administrative districts
called “Xisha District” and “Nansha District” under
Sansha City of Hainan Province in April 2020.
In response to these actions by China, critical
voices are being raised by others besides claimants.
For example, in July 2020 the United States issued a
Chapter
4
Trends Concerning New Domains including Outer Space, Cyberspace, and Electromagnetic Spectrum,
and Challenges Facing the International Community
2
3
4
179
statement from the U.S. Secretary of State saying that
China’s maritime claims in the South China Sea are
unlawful. The State Department also released a report,
in January 2022, about the way that China’s unlawful
claims of territorial rights and jurisdiction gravely
undermine the rule of law in the oceans.
(3) Unintended Contingency Avoidance Initiatives
Despite these numerous acts that could pose risks
to securing the stable use of oceans and airspace, in
recent years progress has been made in efforts to avert
and prevent unintended consequences in the seas and
skies. First, at the Japan-China summit meeting held
on May 9, 2018, Japan and China agreed to establish
a “Maritime and Aerial Communication Mechanism
between the Defense Authorities of Japan and China”
with the aim of avoiding unintended confrontations
between the naval vessels and aircraft of the SDF and
PLA. The mechanism went into operation in June of the
same year.
As for multi-national initiatives, in April 2014, navies
of participating countries of the Western Pacific Naval
Symposium (WPNS), including Japan, the United
States, and China, adopted the Code for Unplanned
Encounters at Sea (CUES).4 CUES sets forth a code
of conduct such as procedures and communication
method to ensure safety for unexpected encounters by
vessels or aircraft of the navies of these countries. In
November 2014, the United States and China agreed on
measures pertaining to mutual notification of military
activities, together with rules of behavior to avert
collisions in waters and airspace in accordance with
CUES and other frameworks. In September 2015, the
two countries announced an agreement concerning an
additional annex stipulating rules of behavior to avert
air encounters. Between ASEAN and China, official
discussions have been held for the establishment of the
Code of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
(COC).
It is strongly hoped that these initiatives designed to
avert and prevent unintended consequences in the seas
and skies will supplement the existing international
order and that the countries concerned, including China,
refrain from unilateral actions that add to tension and
According to the annual report “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. DoD (2021).
For example, the Philippines’ Department of National Defense expressed deep concern over the presence of 220 Chinese maritime militia vessels around Whitsun Reef, and demanded immediate
withdrawal in March 2021.
This code is not legally binding and does not supersede the annexes of the Convention on International Civil Aviation and other international treaties.
DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022
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