Part I Chapter Security Environment Surrounding Japan Russian armored vehicles drive in Ukraine [SPUTNIK/Jiji Press Photo] 2 Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine As factors that led Russia to invade Ukraine, political ones, including Russia’s recognition of NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat, are pointed out. In particular, if Ukraine and Georgia joined NATO on their own will after other Central and Eastern European countries and the Baltic states, Russia would lose more of its buffer zones with NATO on the western border. Also, if Ukraine sought to practically increase its military capabilities and interoperability with NATO by developing its cooperation with the alliance with the will to join, even if there was no prospect for them to join, it would imperil Ukraine as a Russian “sphere of influence,” which Russia considered unacceptable. On the other hand, it is pointed out that some more military factors directly led Russia to decide to invade Ukraine. Namely, it is conceivable that Russia might have had an optimistic assessment about Ukraine’s will and military capability to resist invaders based on its successful experience of “annexing” Crimea in 2014 and on that Russia had grown increasingly confident about the Russian military capability improvements through structural reforms and modernization under the Putin administration.5 In the initial phase of its aggression against Ukraine, the Russian military launched missile attacks to destroy Ukrainian air defense systems and air power. But Russian troops started ground invasions on multiple fronts, from northern Ukraine and the northeastern border to the capital Kyiv, from the eastern border to Kharkiv, and from the Crimean Peninsula to Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, 5 11 and the coast of the Sea of Azov without carrying out thorough missile attacks and securing air superiority. Regarding the reasons why Russian troops did not carry out thorough missile attacks, some point out that the Russian military might have had optimistic assessments that they would be able to discourage Ukraine from resisting and incapacitate the Ukrainian military with missile attacks and simultaneous ground invasions on multiple fronts and that the Russian military might have been lacking adequate targeting capability for missile attacks such as reconnaissance satellites in addition to the problem on its insufficient supply capability caused by the limitation of missile production capability. Furthermore, poor coordination between the Russian Land Force and the Aerospace Force due to the lack of inter-service joint operation capabilities, and the separate commanding structure by different military districts for each operational front due to the absence of a unified commanding authority, lead to the lack of air support for ground units as well as too stretched posture and piecemeal attacks of ground forces. It could be seen that these are the major factors that allowed Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and State Border Guards to repel each Russian units separately. Ukraine’s Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Maliar announced as of about one and a half days after Russia started its aggression against Ukraine that the Russian side had lost 2,800 personnel, up to 80 tanks, and 516 armored combat vehicles. It is pointed out that these huge Russian losses were caused by the Ukrainian military making effective use of equipment including antitank missiles provided by the United States and other NATO member states. The Russian military not only started its ground invasion on the same day as missiles attacks but also occupied Hostomel Airport in northwestern Kyiv by airborne units on the day of the start of invasion and attempted to invade Kyiv by light armored units on the day after the start of invasion. These moves imply that Russia planned to remove the Zelenskyy administration by initially seizing the capital Kyiv. From the earliest stage of the Russian aggression, President Zelenskyy clearly and consistently showed his intention to stay in Kyiv, resulting in a failed attempt by Russia to As an example of explanations for the reasons why Russian political and military leaders, including President Putin, decided to invade Ukraine, on March 8, 2022, William Burns, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), said during a House Intelligence Committee hearing: Putin judged the situation as suitable for the use of force against Ukraine on the basis of the following assumptions: (1) Ukraine is so weak that it can easily be intimidated; (2) Public attention will be distracted from the Ukraine situation in Europe, especially France and Germany, due to a presidential election and a change of government; (3) The Russian economy will be able to weather the sanctions; and (4) Russia’s modernized military can win in a quick and decisive manner at minimum costs. DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2022

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