A/76/135
(a) Putting in place at the national level comprehensive, transparent, objective
and impartial frameworks and mechanisms for supply chain risk management,
consistent with a State’s international obligations. Such frameworks may include risk
assessments that take into account a variety of factors, including the benefits and risks
of new technologies.
(b) Establishing policies and programmes to objectively promote the adoption
of good practices by suppliers and vendors of ICT equipment and systems in order to
build international confidence in the integrity and security of ICT products and
services, enhance quality and promote choice.
(c) Increased attention in national policy and in dialogue with States and
relevant actors at the United Nations and other fora on how to ensure all States can
compete and innovate on an equal footing, so as to enable the full realization of ICTs
to increase global social and economic development and contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, while also safeguarding national
security and the public interest.
(d) Cooperative measures such as exchanges of good practices at the bilateral,
regional and multilateral levels on supply chain risk management; developing and
implementing globally interoperable common rules and standards for supply chain
security; and other approaches aimed at decreasing supply ch ain vulnerabilities.
58. To prevent the development and proliferation of malicious ICT tools and
techniques and the use of harmful hidden functions, including backdoors, States can
consider putting in place at the national level:
(a) Measures to enhance the integrity of the supply chain, including by
requiring ICT vendors to incorporate safety and security in the design, development
and throughout the lifecycle of ICT products. To this end, States may also consider
establishing independent and impartial certification processes.
(b)
privacy.
Legislative and other safeguards that enhance the protection of data and
(c) Measures that prohibit the introduction of harmful hidden functions and
the exploitation of vulnerabilities in ICT products that may compromise the
confidentiality, integrity and availability of systems and networks, including in
critical infrastructure.
59. In addition to the steps and measures outlined above, States should continue to
encourage the private sector and civil society to play an appropriate role to improve
the security of and in the use of ICTs, including supply chain security for ICT
products, and thus contribute to meeting the objectives of this norm.
Norm 13 (j) States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT
vulnerabilities and share associated information on available remedies to such
vulnerabilities to limit and possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and
ICT-dependent infrastructure.
60. This norm reminds States of the importance of ensuring that ICT v ulnerabilities
are addressed quickly in order to reduce the possibility of exploitation by malicious
actors. Timely discovery and responsible disclosure and reporting of ICT
vulnerabilities can prevent harmful or threatening practices, increase trust and
confidence, and reduce related threats to international security and stability.
61. Vulnerability disclosure policies and programmes, as well as related
international cooperation, aim to provide a reliable and consistent process to routinize
such disclosures. A coordinated vulnerability disclosure process can minimize the
harm to society posed by vulnerable products and systematize the reporting of ICT
21-04030
15/26
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