A/76/135 vulnerabilities and requests for assistance between countries and emergency response teams. Such processes should be consistent with domestic legislation. 62. At the national, regional and international level, States could consider putting in place impartial legal frameworks, policies and programmes to guide decision making on the handling of ICT vulnerabilities and curb their commercial distribution as a means to protect against any misuse that may pose a risk to international peace and security or human rights and fundamental freedoms. States could also consider putting in place legal protections for researchers and penetration testers. 63. In addition, and in consultation with relevant industry and other ICT security actors, States can develop guidance and incentives, consistent with relevant international technical standards, on the responsible reporting and management of vulnerabilities and the respective roles and responsibilities of different stakeholders in reporting processes; the types of technical information to be disclosed or publicly shared, including the sharing of technical information on ICT incidents that are severe; and how to handle sensitive data and ensure the security and confidentiality of information. 64. The recommendations on confidence-building and international cooperation, assistance and capacity-building of previous GGEs can be particularly helpful for developing a shared understanding of the mechanisms and processes that States can put in place for responsible vulnerability disclosure. States can consider using existing multilateral, regional and sub-regional bodies and other relevant channels and platforms involving different stakeholders to this end. Norm 13 (k) States should not conduct or knowingly support activity to harm the information systems of the authorized emergency response teams (sometimes known as computer emergency response teams or cybersecurity incident response teams) of another State. A State should not use authorized emergency response teams to engage in malicious international activity. 65. This norm reflects the fact that CERTs/CSIRTs or other authorized res ponse bodies have unique responsibilities and functions in managing and resolving ICT incidents, and thereby play an important role in contributing to the maintenance of international peace and security. They are essential to effectively detecting and mitigating the immediate and long-term negative effects of ICT incidents. Harm to emergency response teams can undermine trust and hinder their ability to carry out their functions and can have wider, often unforeseen consequences across sectors and potentially for international peace and security. The Group underscores the importance of avoiding the politicization of CERTs/CSIRTs and respecting the independent character of their functions. 66. In recognition of their critical role in protecting national secur ity, the public and preventing economic loss deriving from ICT-related incidents, many States categorize CERTs/CSIRTs as part of their critical infrastructure. 67. In considering how their actions regarding emergency response teams can contribute to international peace and security, States could publicly declare or put in place measures affirming that they will not use authorized emergency response teams to engage in malicious international activity and acknowledge and respect the domains of operation and ethical principles that guide the work of authorized emergency response teams. The Group takes note of emerging initiatives in this regard. 68. States could also consider putting in place other measures such as a national ICT-security incident management framework with designated roles and responsibilities, including for CERTs/CSIRTs, to facilitate cooperation and 16/26 21-04030

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