A/76/135
20. In this regard, and in furtherance of this norm, the Group encourages States to
refrain from using ICTs and ICT networks to carry out activities that can threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.
21. The measures recommended by previous GGEs and the OEWG represent an
initial framework for responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs. As further
guidance, and to facilitate such cooperation, the Group recommends that States put in
place or strengthen existing mechanisms, structures and procedures at the national
level such as relevant policy, legislation and corresponding review processes;
mechanisms for crisis and incident management; whole -of-government cooperative
and partnership arrangements; and cooperative and dialogue arrangements with the
private sector, academia, civil society and the technical community. States are also
encouraged to compile and streamline the information they present on the
implementation of the norms, including by voluntarily surveying their national efforts
and sharing their experiences.
Norm 13 (b) In case of ICT incidents, States should consider all relevant
information, including the larger context of the event, the challenges of
attribution in the ICT environment, and the nature and extent of
the consequences.
22. This norm acknowledges that attribution is a complex undertaking and that a
broad range of factors should be considered before establishing the source of an ICT
incident. In this regard, the caution called for in paragraph 71 (g) of this report and in
previous GGE reports can help avert misunderstandings and escalation of tensions
between States.
23. States that are subject to malicious ICT activity, and States from whose territory
such malicious ICT activity is suspected to have originated, are encouraged to consult
among relevant competent authorities.
24. A State that is victim of a malicious ICT incident should consider all aspects in
its assessment of the incident. Such aspects, supported by substantiated facts, can
include the incident’s technical attributes; its scope, scale and impact; the wider
context, including the incident’s bearing on international peace and security; and the
results of consultations between the States concerned.
25. An affected State’s response to malicious ICT activity attributable to another
State should be in accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United
Nations and other international law, including those relating to the settlement of
disputes by peaceful means and internationally wrongful acts. States could also avail
of the full range of diplomatic, legal and other consultative options available to them,
as well as voluntary mechanisms and other political commitments that allow for the
settlement of disagreements and disputes through consultation and other peaceful
means.
26. To operationalize this norm at the national level and facilitate the investigation
and resolution of ICT incidents involving other States, States can establish or
strengthen relevant national structures, ICT-related policies, processes, legislative
frameworks, coordination mechanisms, as well as partnerships and other forms of
engagement with relevant stakeholders to assess the severity and replicability of an
ICT incident.
27. Cooperation at the regional and international levels, including between nati onal
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)/Computer Security Incident
Response Teams (CSIRTs), the ICT authorities of States and the diplomatic
community, can strengthen the ability of States to detect and investigate malicious
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