A/76/135 20. In this regard, and in furtherance of this norm, the Group encourages States to refrain from using ICTs and ICT networks to carry out activities that can threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. 21. The measures recommended by previous GGEs and the OEWG represent an initial framework for responsible State behaviour in the use of ICTs. As further guidance, and to facilitate such cooperation, the Group recommends that States put in place or strengthen existing mechanisms, structures and procedures at the national level such as relevant policy, legislation and corresponding review processes; mechanisms for crisis and incident management; whole -of-government cooperative and partnership arrangements; and cooperative and dialogue arrangements with the private sector, academia, civil society and the technical community. States are also encouraged to compile and streamline the information they present on the implementation of the norms, including by voluntarily surveying their national efforts and sharing their experiences. Norm 13 (b) In case of ICT incidents, States should consider all relevant information, including the larger context of the event, the challenges of attribution in the ICT environment, and the nature and extent of the consequences. 22. This norm acknowledges that attribution is a complex undertaking and that a broad range of factors should be considered before establishing the source of an ICT incident. In this regard, the caution called for in paragraph 71 (g) of this report and in previous GGE reports can help avert misunderstandings and escalation of tensions between States. 23. States that are subject to malicious ICT activity, and States from whose territory such malicious ICT activity is suspected to have originated, are encouraged to consult among relevant competent authorities. 24. A State that is victim of a malicious ICT incident should consider all aspects in its assessment of the incident. Such aspects, supported by substantiated facts, can include the incident’s technical attributes; its scope, scale and impact; the wider context, including the incident’s bearing on international peace and security; and the results of consultations between the States concerned. 25. An affected State’s response to malicious ICT activity attributable to another State should be in accordance with its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, including those relating to the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and internationally wrongful acts. States could also avail of the full range of diplomatic, legal and other consultative options available to them, as well as voluntary mechanisms and other political commitments that allow for the settlement of disagreements and disputes through consultation and other peaceful means. 26. To operationalize this norm at the national level and facilitate the investigation and resolution of ICT incidents involving other States, States can establish or strengthen relevant national structures, ICT-related policies, processes, legislative frameworks, coordination mechanisms, as well as partnerships and other forms of engagement with relevant stakeholders to assess the severity and replicability of an ICT incident. 27. Cooperation at the regional and international levels, including between nati onal Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)/Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs), the ICT authorities of States and the diplomatic community, can strengthen the ability of States to detect and investigate malicious 21-04030 9/26

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