A/76/135 characteristics and concerns, while inter-regional exchanges allow for mutual learning between such organizations. States are encouraged to continue this work, as well as actively engage with those States not currently members of a relevant regional or sub-regional organization. 81. To continue strengthening cooperative measures relevant to national computer emergency response teams and other authorized bodies, States could enco urage the sharing and dissemination of information and good practices on establishing and sustaining national CERTs/CSIRTs and on incident management through existing regional and global emergency response organizations and networks. Such encouragement and support for CERTs/CSIRTs would also serve to raise awareness among States of their commitments with regard to CERTs/CSIRTs and other related bodies under norm 13 (k). Transparency measures 82. Exercising transparency on a voluntary basis through the exchange of national views and practices on ICT security incidents and other related threats and by making ICT security advice, guidance, evidence base and data supporting decisions publicly available is important for building trust and predictability, reducing the possibility of misinterpretation and escalation, and helping organizations and agencies make good risk management decisions. 83. To further advance transparency and predictability of State behaviour, provide exposure to a wider range of views and experiences and enhance State preparedness and early awareness of growing threats, States could consider using bilateral, sub -regional, regional and multilateral fora and informal consultations to voluntarily share: information and good practices, lessons or white papers on existing and emerging ICT security-related threats and incidents; national strategies and standards for vulnerability analysis of ICT products; and national and regional approaches to risk management and conflict prevention, including national approaches to classifying ICT incidents in terms of the scale and seriousness of the incident. 84. States can also avail of these existing fora to clarify positions and voluntarily exchange information on: national approaches to ICT security; data protection; the protection of ICT-enabled critical infrastructure; and ICT-security agency mission and functions, and ICT strategy at the national or organizational level, and the legal and oversight regimes under which they operate. 85. The recommendations on CBMs in previous GGE reports provide a cooperative basis for addressing growing threats to critical infrastructure -related challenges and for implementing the relevant norms. States are encouraged to continue raising awareness on the importance of critical infrastructure protection, promoting information sharing among critical infrastructure stakeholders and sharing of good practices and guidance. Where appropriate, they can use existing platforms and reporting modalities (see paragraph 86) to voluntarily share national views on the classification of critical national infrastructure and critical infrastructure providing essential services regionally or internationally, relevant national policies and legislation, and frameworks for risk assessment and for identifying, classifying and managing ICT incidents affecting critical infrastructure. 86. States could also use United Nations resources such as voluntary reporting to the Secretary-General, the Cyber Policy Portal of the United Nations Inst itute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), as well as the resources of other relevant international and regional organizations to consolidate information and good practices provided voluntarily by States on national strategies, policies, legislation and programmes that address ICT security issues relevant to international security and stability. 20/26 21-04030

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