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3
including military cooperation, with the exception of
ambassador-level NRC meetings as a result of Russia’s
illegal “annexation” of the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea in southern Ukraine in 2014.
(3) The “Annexation” of Crimea and Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
Following a political upheaval in Ukraine in February
2014, armed forces purported to be Russian troops
occupied the Council of Ministers building and the
Parliamentary building in the Autonomous Republic
of Crimea in southern Ukraine and also took control
of airports and highways leading to the mainland of
Ukraine, and major Ukrainian military installations.
After taking de facto control of the Autonomous
Republic of Crimea, Russia illegally “annexed” Crimea
in March of the same year following the results of a
“referendum” held in the republic.
Meanwhile, in April 2014, separatists and other
forces increased their protests and attacks against an
interim Ukrainian government in eastern Ukraine and
occupied many buildings, including the Council of
Ministers buildings. In response to this situation, the
interim Ukrainian government condemned Russia over
its alleged involvement and mobilized military forces
in an attempt to expel the occupying forces, but failed
to settle the situation. In May 2014, a “referendum”
was held for or against expanding autonomy under the
control of the separatist forces in parts of the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions in eastern Ukraine. Because the
negotiations between Ukrainian government and the
separatist forces failed to reach a breakthrough, the
Ukrainian forces continued fighting with the separatists
receiving a range of support, including purported
Russian direct intervention.
In September 2014 and February 2015, the Organization
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Russia,
and Ukraine signed “the Minsk agreements”3 for making
peace. But sporadic fighting continued in the ensuing
years with no progress in the implementation of many
of the matters stipulated by the agreements, causing an
estimated more than 10,000 casualties.
Chapter
2
Russia’s Aggression against Ukraine
of the so-called eastward expansion of NATO. In 2002
Ukraine also expressed its will to join NATO in the future
both domestically and internationally and embarked on
Defense Ministry and military reforms with NATO’s
cooperation. But because a consensus had not necessarily
been reached within Ukraine on joining NATO by that time
and different attitudes towards joining the alliance were
expressed every time there was a change of government,
Ukraine’s participation in the NATO Membership Action
Plan (MAP) was postponed, although the country’s
joining the alliance in the future was agreed on at the
NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, in 2008.
Meanwhile, Russia and NATO had a certain level of
cooperative relationship at that time, as shown by Russia’s
participation in the PfP and the cooperation between
NATO and Russia in the Bosnian conflict. In addition,
Russia was treated differently from Central and Eastern
European countries and other former Soviet states in terms
of the relationship with NATO, and in 1997 the NATORussia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established as a
framework of sharing what was determined within NATO
with Russia. In 2002, the PJC was reorganized into the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which allowed Russia to
participate in a certain level of decision-making in common
areas of interest as an equal NATO partner.
With Russia having this level of cooperation with
NATO, Russia did not necessarily continue to strongly
oppose NATO member states eastward expansion. In its
2000 military doctrine, Russia regarded as threats the
expansion of a military bloc and an alliance that could
damage its military security and explicitly evaluated
NATO as a threat in its 2010 military doctrine and
beyond. But Russia eventually acquiesced the Baltic
states joining NATO in 2004 when the Russian president
was Putin, who is now leading the Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine. It is also necessary to note that Russia
and NATO basically had a relationship of cooperation,
including their Air Forces conducting joint exercises,2
except for a certain time after the 2008 Russo-Georgian
War until NATO and European countries halted in
principle their working-level cooperation with Russia,
The NATO-Russia air force joint exercise “Vigilant Skies” was conducted from 2011 to 2013 as part of cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).
The Minsk Protocol of September 2014 consists of the following items: (1) ensure the immediate bilateral cessation of the use of weapons; (2) ensure monitoring and verification by the
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) of the regime of non-use of weapons; (3) enact the Law of Ukraine “With respect to the temporary status of local self- government in
certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions” (Law on Special Status); (4) ensure monitoring on the Ukrainian-Russian state border and verification by the OSCE, together with the creation
of a security area in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; (5) immediately release all hostages and unlawfully detained persons; (6) prohibit the prosecution and punishment
of persons in connection with the events that took place in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (7) conduct an inclusive national dialogue; (8) adopt measures aimed at improving
the humanitarian situation in Donbas; (9) ensure the holding of early local elections in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; (10) remove unlawful military formations, military hardware, as well as
militants and mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine; (11) adopt a program for the economic revival of Donbass and the recovery of economic activity in the region; and (12) provide personal
security guarantees for the participants of the consultations.
DEFENSE WHITE PAPER
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